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We assess the determinants of the wide variation in the efficiency of foreign aid activities across 
US-based non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In particular, we analyze whether non-
charitable expenditures for administration, management and fundraising depend on the intensity of 
competition among NGOs and on the degree to which they are refinanced by governments. We 
control for NGO heterogeneity in various dimensions as well as major characteristics of recipient 
countries. We find that fiercer competition is associated with more efficient foreign aid activities of 
NGOs, rather than leading to “excessive” fundraising. Official funding tends to increase 
administrative costs. Nevertheless, officially financed NGOs spend relatively more on charitable 
activities since they are less concerned with collecting private donations through fundraising efforts. 
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1.  Introduction 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play an important role in international development 
cooperation, notably for aid from the United States (Barro and McCleary 2008). This is at least 
partly because NGOs are widely believed to be more efficient than official aid agencies in 
delivering foreign aid to the poor and needy in recipient countries (e.g., McCoskey 2009). Yet it is 
open to question whether NGOs that are closer to the poor help reduce bureaucratic interference and 
administrative costs of aid delivery. According to Kerlin and Thanasombat (2006), scandals in the 
non-profit sector have resulted in increased pressure on NGOs to limit spending not directly related 
to charitable projects. Expenses for administration and management accounted for 6.1 percent of the 
overall budget of more than 550 US NGOs engaged in international development cooperation in 
2007. The OECD reports a slightly lower share of 5.7 percent when relating the administrative costs 
of official US agencies to their overall disbursements of foreign aid.
1
Furthermore, US NGOs differ strikingly with respect to the relative importance of expenses 
that are not directly associated with charitable activity and overseas aid programs. The share of 
expenses for administration and management varies from zero to about half of the overall budget 
within our sample of US NGOs. A similarly wide variation can be observed for the share of 




To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to empirically assess possible 
determinants of the widely varying efficiency across NGOs as donors in international development 
cooperation. In particular, we assess how the structure of financing and the degree of competition 
among NGOs affect non-charitable expenses and the efficiency of NGO aid delivery, drawing on 
hypotheses advanced in the theoretical literature on non-profits. We control for other dimensions of 
NGO heterogeneity, including their size, experience and headquarter (HQ) location. At the same 
time, we account for local conditions in the recipient countries as well as sector-specific effects that 
may have a say on the efficiency of NGO aid. 
 
We make use of detailed information provided by the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) in a registry of US NGOs engaged in international development 
cooperation. It appears that this database has not been used so far to evaluate the efficiency of NGO 
aid. Performing cross-section regression analyses, we find that fiercer competition is associated 
with more efficient foreign aid activities of NGOs. Official funding tends to increase administrative 
                                                 
1 Note that these shares are not fully comparable as the NGO figure includes domestic programs within the United 
States. OECD data are available at: http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/Default.aspx?DatasetCode=CRSNEW. 
2 See Appendix B for summary statistics.   2 
costs. Nevertheless, officially funded NGOs spend relatively more on charitable activities since they 
are less concerned with collecting private donations through fundraising efforts.  
  
2.  Related literature and hypotheses 
We consider two major forms of non-productive, i.e., not directly charitable NGO expenses: (i) 
costs for administration and management and (ii) expenses for fundraising. NGO aid delivery is 
assumed to be less “efficient” if these two items represent a relatively high share in the NGO’s 
overall budget. Our measures of inefficiency correspond closely to the so-called efficiency price of 
NGO aid. Ribar and Wilhelm (2002: 400) define the efficiency price as the “reciprocal of the share 
of service expenditures (total expenditures less fund-raising and administrative expenses) in total 
expenditures.”  
Fundraising represents a “potential source of inefficiency” (Aldashev and Verdier 2010: 48). 
NGOs under fierce pressure to attract donations may engage in “excessive” fundraising and shift an 
increasing amount of time and effort “from finding solutions and helping needy recipients to 
pleasing their donors and winning television coverage” (The Economist, January 27, 2000). The 
previous literature on fundraising is mainly concerned with the question of whether more 
fundraising has the desired effect of attracting more donations (e.g., Otken and Weisbrod 2000).
3 In 
the present context of efficient aid delivery by NGOs, it is more relevant that earlier theoretical 
models, notably Rose-Ackerman (1982), predict particularly high expenses for fundraising in a 
competitive market with free NGO entry, even when donors dislike fundraising activity by NGOs. 
Likewise, the recent model of Aldashev and Verdier (2010) shows  that an NGO increases its 
fundraising if an additional NGO enters the market and the amount of overall donations is assumed 
to be fixed. This is because it becomes more important for “incumbents” to form closer bonds with 
donors in order not to lose them to competing NGOs. However, the entry of additional NGOs may 
reduce the incumbents’ fundraising effort once the assumption of a fixed amount of overall 
donations is relaxed.
4
Theoretical predictions on the efficiency of NGO aid become still more complex if NGOs 
can divert part of their revenues for private use rather than charitable and project-related output. 
Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) consider the not-for-profit status to be a means of committing to “soft 
incentives,” i.e., protecting stakeholders such as volunteers, donors, consumers and employees from 
 These authors conclude that it is an empirical issue which model specification 
applies best in reality. 
                                                 
3 Otken and Weisbrod (2000) as well as Khanna and Sandler (2000) argue that fundraising may have two countervailing 
effects on donations: (i) a direct and positive effect by providing potential donors with better information, and (ii) an 
indirect and negative effect by diverting NGO funds away from charitable activity and, thereby, increasing the price of 
giving. 
4 A new entrant would then contribute to raising the overall amount of donations, rather than fully diverting donations 
away from incumbents.   3 
ex post expropriation of profits by executives exercising control over the organization. In other 
words, NGOs are subject to the so-called non-distribution constraint (Hansmann 1980; Werker and 
Ahmed 2008). However, the non-distribution constraint may prove to be rather soft once the weak 
nature of corporate control in many NGOs is taken into account (Glaeser 2002). This would offer 
possibilities for perquisite consumption, i.e., expenditures that increase the utility of NGO 
volunteers, workers and managers but do not contribute to the charitable objectives of the NGO. 
Perquisite consumption may be included in various accounting categories, ranging from travel 
expenses and headquarter facilities to office equipment and pay. Lacking a detailed breakdown of 
relevant expenditure items of NGOs, overall expenditures for administration and management serve 
as a proxy for soft non-distribution constraints and related NGO inefficiency (Ribar and Wilhelm 
2002; Castaneda et al. 2008). 
Aldashev and Verdier (2010) argue that non-productive NGO expenses in the form of 
fundraising and perquisite consumption tend to be complements. Fundraising activity reduces the 
time left for managing and supervising charitable operations. Less operational effort impairs the 
productivity of funds spent on projects. This implies that the opportunity costs of perquisite 
consumption  decline,  strengthening the NGOs’  incentives to divert further funds away from 
charitable operations. According to the model of Aldashev and Verdier, NGOs may even divert 
more funds when they are subject to fiercer competition from peers.
5 This contrasts with Castaneda 
et al. (2008) who expect fiercer competition among NGOs to increase fundraising, but to reduce 
perquisite consumption.
6
Indeed, Castaneda et al. (2008) find empirical support for their theoretical predictions. In 
particular, competition is associated with lower administrative expenses. Similar to our analysis 
below, Castaneda et al. perform cross-section OLS estimations for a large sample of US NGOs. 
However, their focus is on local NGOs in terms of the source of donations as well as output 
delivery.  Our sample consists of NGOs engaged in international development cooperation. 
Therefore, we also account for major characteristics of recipient countries that may influence the 
efficiency of NGO aid.
  
7
In addition to the effects of competition among peers, the efficiency of NGOs is likely to 
depend on the relative importance of different sources of NGO funding. The structure of NGO 
funding appears to be most relevant in the context of foreign aid. In particular, official refinancing 
often plays an important role for NGOs engaged in international development cooperation and is 
 
                                                 
5 This is the case when NGO managers have only a weak outside option of leaving the NGO sector and, instead, 
working in the for-profit sector. 
6 See also Glaeser (2002) who suspects that it is due to competition in the market for customers and donors why NGOs 
“perform their basic missions reasonably,” even though weak governance institutions allow for capture by workers and 
managers. 
7 See section 3 for details.   4 
likely to affect their behavior. Most of the previous literature has been concerned with the reactions 
of private donors, rather than the NGOs themselves, to official refinancing of NGOs. According to 
Andreoni and Payne (2003: 792), it is the “accepted belief” that private donors treat official grants 
as imperfect substitutes for their own giving.
8
 Another strand of the literature has addressed the question of whether the structure of NGO 
financing affects the allocation of NGO aid across recipient countries (e.g., Dreher et al. 2010).  
Though clearly related to the spending behavior of NGOs, the efficiency of aid delivery as reflected 
in administrative and funding expenditures has not been addressed in this literature either. Yet, 
previous research has raised some specific hypotheses on how official refinancing may affect the 
efficiency of NGO aid delivery. Opposing effects are expected for fundraising and administrative 
expenditures. 
 The estimates of Ribar and Wilhelm (2002) for 125 
US NGOs engaged in international relief and development operations reveal little evidence of 
official funding having eroded the incentives of private giving during the period 1986-1992. 
McCleary and Barro (2008) even find that official funding of US NGOs engaged in international 
development serves as “a magnet for attracting private funds.” 
On the one hand, NGOs are likely to spend relatively less on fundraising if official 
refinancing is sufficiently high to relieve the pressure of attracting private donations. Andreoni and 
Payne (2003) argue that it may actually be the NGOs themselves, rather than private donors, who 
react strategically by reducing fundraising efforts when they receive official funds.
9 On the other 
hand, stronger reliance on official refinancing may be associated with higher administrative costs. 
Applying for official funds typically involves considerable paperwork; NGO managers may have to 
spend a substantial amount of time with official agencies to ensure successful applications. Kerlin 
(2006: 382) explicitly refers to USAID regulations and paperwork that “can overwhelm even 
experienced INGOs.” Cooley and Ron (2002) argue that in particular the “marketization” of official 
NGO funding tends to work against NGO efficiency, in contrast to the efficiency enhancing effects 
expected by the proponents of marketization.
10
                                                 
8 Earlier studies on whether official funding crowds out (or rather crowds in) private donations to NGOs with domestic 
activities in the United States and the United Kingdom include Payne (1998), Okten and Weisbrod (2000), and Khanna 
and Sandler (2000). 
 In the view of Cooley and Ron (2002: 17), the 
increasing use of competitive tenders and renewable contracts by official backdonors discourages 
cost-saving cooperation among NGOs and leads to waste and duplication as NGOs “may seek to 
undermine competitors, conceal information, and act unilaterally.” More fundamentally, waste and 
perquisite consumption may result if access to official funding softens the budget constraint of 
NGOs. The contention that soft budget constraints  (SBC)  –  due to  financial backing by the 
government – cause inefficiency commands wide support with regard to state-owned enterprises 
9 They find empirical support for arts and social service organizations operating within the United States. 
10 See Koch et al. (2007) for a more detailed discussion of the marketization of NGO aid.   5 
(Kornai et al, 2003). The so-called SBC syndrome may equally impair officially funded NGO 
operations. 
 In summary, the theoretical literature offers conflicting hypotheses on the effects of 
competition among NGO on the efficiency of their aid delivery. The predictions concerning the 
effects of official financing of NGOs on fundraising and administrative expenditures appear less 
ambiguous. However, empirical evidence is extremely scarce for all four cells of the overview 
below: 
 
Expected relationships between competition, funding and NGO efficiency 
  Expenses for 
fundraising 
Costs of administration 
and management 
Competition  +/- ?  +/- ? 
Official funding  -  + 
 
 
3.  Variables and method 
We analyze major determinants of the efficiency of aid delivery through NGOs across a large 
sample of 559 US-based NGOs.
11 We follow McCleary and Barro (2006) in that an NGO must 
register with USAID to be included in our sample. A key criterion for registration is that the NGO 
engages in international development cooperation, including relief efforts, which is the focus of the 
present paper. In line with the relevant literature, two dependent variables represent our proxies of 
inefficiency: (i) administrative and management costs, and (ii) expenses for fundraising.
12 Both 
dependent variables are defined in percent of the NGO’s total expenses; they relate to the year 
2007.
13
Among the possible determinants of administrative costs and expenses for fundraising, we 
are mainly interested in assessing the effects of competition among NGOs and the effects of official 
funding. In defining our measure of competition, we take a similar approach as Ribar and Wilhelm 
(2002). The assumption is that competition in a particular recipient country increases with the 
number of NGOs being active there, relative to the country’s population.  This implies that a 
particular NGO is subject to stronger competition the more its foreign aid activity in its particular 
set of recipient countries overlaps with the foreign aid activities of other NGOs. As information on 
 
                                                 
11  We lose some observations because of missing data for explanatory variables. This leaves us with 518 NGOs 
included in the estimations reported in section 4. Note also that some variables of major interest, notably our indicator 
of competition among NGOs, are not available over time. This prevents us from performing panel estimations. 
12 See McCleary and Barro (2006; 2008) for a detailed description of the expenditure and revenue data for US NGOs 
engaged in international development cooperation. We are most grateful to Rachel McCleary for advising us on data 
issues.  
13 See Appendix A for the definition of variables and sources.   6 
the country-specific amount of NGO aid is lacking, we use an approximation: For each NGO j we 
calculate the share of countries that overlap with the country mix of NGO i. Multiplying the share 
with the overseas program expenditures of NGO j results in the total overlap of overseas program 
expenditures between NGO i and j.
14 Adding up the overlaps between NGO i and all other NGOs 






























where  Overseas_expensesj  stands for total expenses in overseas programs of NGO j,  
Countries_activeij  is the number of countries in which both NGOs  i  and  j  are active, 
Countries_activej is the total number of countries in which NGO j is active, and Populationi is the 
total population of the countries in which NGO i is active. 
  In order to assess the effects of official funding, we account for the share of all sources of 
official refinancing in the overall revenues of each NGO in the sample. In our baseline estimations, 
this share relates to the sum of official funding from USAID, other US government sources, other 
(non-US) governments, and international organizations (IO). As argued above, we expect that a 
higher share of official refinancing is associated with higher administrative costs and provides 
better opportunities to soften the non-distribution constraint. However, this effect may differ 
between major types and sources of official support. We account for this possibility by separating 
official funds from USAID, other US government sources and non-US sources in extended 
estimations. Alternatively, we distinguish between contract-related financing of NGOs and other 
types of official  support.  On the one hand,  contract-related financing  could limit perquisite 
consumption as this type of official support often explicitly excludes administrative HQ expenses. 
On the other hand, administrative and management costs may increase because of the bureaucratic 
procedures of contract-related financing (Cooley and Ron 2002).  
In addition to the share of official funding, we also include the share of private revenue in 
NGOs’ total revenues. Note that private revenue is distinct from private donations; it captures 
revenues the NGOs may raise through commercial activity, e.g., fees received from selling private 
goods that are related to the NGO’s mission and income from “ancillary” activities (Weisbrod 1998: 
                                                 
14 In line with Ribar and Wilhelm (2002), we assume as an approximation that the NGOs allocate their overseas 
program expenditures equally across recipient countries.  
15 By dividing the resulting sum by the population we assume that competition among NGOs decreases with the size of 
the countries.   7 
48).  Ly (2006)  finds evidence for  “mental accounting;”  the spending patterns of NGOs differ 
between donations and revenues from commercial activity, with the latter being less related to 
charitable expenditures. This suggests that perquisite consumption rises with higher commercial 
income. 
Apart from competition and the financing structure of NGOs, we control for various aspects 
of NGO heterogeneity in our estimations. We measure the size of NGOs by logged overall 
revenues. Larger NGOs may realize economies of scale, while small NGOs may incur relatively 
high administrative and management costs as HQ services are shared by fewer projects in a limited 
number of recipient countries. At the same time, smaller NGOs may economize on fundraising. 
They may free-ride on fundraising by larger NGOs once it is taken into account that fundraising 
efforts have two effects: influencing donor choices of which NGO to give to, and “awakening” 
potential donors so that overall donations increase (Aldashev and Verdier 2010). 
The structure of the NGOs’ activities is captured in several ways. Many NGOs in our 
sample are active not only in international development cooperation but also in charitable activity 
within the United States. By including the relative importance of overseas versus domestic activity 
we take into account that domestic activity may involve higher administrative costs. This could be 
because the costs for wages and rents are typically higher in the United States than in foreign 
recipient countries. However, this would matter only if NGOs with more overseas activity had 
outsourced HQ services at least partly to foreign recipient countries. 
Likewise, the effects of diversified overseas activity are ambiguous ex ante. While NGOs 
with activities in a larger number of recipient countries and aid “sectors” may realize economies of 
scope, proliferation in these two dimensions may require more administration and management by 
eroding the NGO’s core competence. As concerns expenses for fundraising, greater diversification 
may provide better opportunities to free-ride on fundraising by other NGOs. On the other hand, a 
diversified NGO may find it more difficult than a more focused NGO to alert potential donors that 
it is also active in the field or country which the public is particularly interested in at a particular 
point in time. We proxy the degree of diversification by the number of (i) countries and (ii) sectors 
in which a particular NGO is active; both proxies are normalized by the NGO’s size in terms of 
total revenues. 
We consider the year when a particular NGO registered with USAID to reflect its experience 
in international development cooperation.  More experienced NGOs should principally be able to 
reduce administrative costs, i.e., become more efficient in operating programs abroad. NGOs 
having established a good reputation should also be able to raise donations with comparatively less 
fundraising effort. However, experienced NGOs might also know better how to soften the non-
distribution constraint and increase perquisite consumption. Another aspect of NGO heterogeneity   8 
concerns its HQ location within the United States. We enter the (logged) average per-capita income 
in the metropolitan area where the HQ is located. In this way, we control for differences in wage 
costs and office rents across HQ locations. 
As noted above, the number of recipient countries in which an NGO is active serves as a 
measure of diversification. At the same time,  the costs of administration, management and 
fundraising may depend on country characteristics. We consider two characteristics that have been 
used widely in the aid allocation literature: the (logged) average per-capita income and control of 
corruption. Local conditions tend to be more difficult in poorer countries so that the HQ costs of 
monitoring overseas programs may be higher when average per-capita income is lower. All the 
same, administrative costs may even rise with higher per-capita income of recipient countries as the 
costs of hiring local experts and renting office space are higher in richer countries. Control of 
corruption, taken from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, reflects the quality of 
local institutions. One might suspect that better control of corruption helps reduce the costs of 
monitoring. It may also induce more fundraising effort given that private donations are more likely 
to respond favorably to such efforts when corruption appears to be under control. Monitoring could 
also be easier,  and fundraising efforts could be more intense if recipient countries are 
geographically relatively close to the United States; we use (logged) distances between Washington, 
DC, and the capital  cities of recipient countries. All three country-related variables  enter  the 
estimation equation as the average over all recipient countries in which the particular NGO is 
active. 
Finally, we control for the importance of particular aid sectors – as reflected by the number 
of NGOs being active in these sectors – even though there no strong priors on its impact on the 
dependent cost variables. For instance, one may expect more fundraising effort in important sectors 
such as basic health and training. On the other hand, free-riding on the efforts of other NGOs may 
be an attractive option in precisely such sectors. Throughout the subsequent analysis, we assess 
whether our results are sensitive to the inclusion of sector-specific effects; these are captured by a 
dummy variable for each sector which is  set equal to one for those NGOs  being active in a 
particular sector.
16
For a start, we consider these variables in  cross-sectional OLS regressions with  NGO-
specific costs of administration and management and, respectively, expenses for fundraising 
representing the two alternative dependent variables. As discussed by Castaneda et al. (2008: 234), 
NGOs may generally be tempted to underreport both cost items. As long as all NGOs underreport to 
the same extent OLS regressions generate a biased constant term, but the coefficients of the 
 This follows previous research on domestic activities of US NGOs that has 
found considerable heterogeneity across sectors (e.g., Otken and Weisbrod 2000).  
                                                 
16 Basic health serves as the benchmark.   9 
variables introduced above are not affected.  It cannot be ruled out, however, that NGOs with higher 
costs have stronger incentives to underreport. The coefficients would then be biased downwards so 
that it becomes less likely to find any effects. By contrast, coefficients might be biased upwards if 
NGOs with, say, minor fundraising do not report it as such.  
As a matter of fact, 17 percent of all NGOs in our sample do not report any expenses for 
fundraising; most of these NGOs are relatively small.
17 Expenses for fundraising are also skewed 
towards zero in the sample of US NGOs with domestic activities in the arts and social sectors used 
by Andreoni and Payne (2003). OLS estimations may not be appropriate  because of the large 
number of zero observations. We follow Andreoni and Payne (2003) and perform Tobit estimations, 
in addition to OLS estimations, to account for the censored nature of our dependent variables.
18
Note that the data we use are a cross section and it is therefore difficult to control for 
possible endogeneity. This may be a problem for official funding in particular. There is little reason 
to be concerned about reverse causality, especially in the estimation with administrative costs as the 
dependent variable.  However,  official funding may be jointly determined with expenses for 
fundraising. Given the cross-section nature of our data it is difficult to come up with convincing 
instruments that would allow us to control adequately for this possible endogeneity (see also Ribar 
and Wilhelm 2002). The fairly long list of controlling variables introduced above should help 
contain an omitted variable bias. Nevertheless we remain cautious in drawing strong causal 
inferences from statistically significant correlations. 
 We 
also perform robustness tests by excluding those NGOs with extraordinarily high cost shares for 
administration and management as well as fundraising (see below for details). In all regressions, we 
estimate robust standard errors in order to account for possible heterogeneity in the error term. 
 
4.  Results 
Table 1 presents our baseline results of the OLS and Tobit estimations. In columns (1) – (4) we 
report the effects on the share of administrative and management costs; the share of expenses for 
fundraising is the dependent variable in columns (5) – (8). As mentioned before, we routinely 
perform two variants of the estimations, without sector dummies (columns 1, 3, 5, and 7) and with 
sector dummies (columns 2, 4, 6, and 8). The sector dummies are supposed to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity across sectors. Indeed, various dummies turn out to be significant at the 
ten percent level or better, compared to the benchmark sector of basic health.  By contrast, the 
number of all NGOs being active in those sectors belonging to a particular NGO’s portfolio – 
                                                 
17  Average revenues for NGOs without any fundraising are US$ 10.8 million, i.e., just 23 percent of the mean for the 
overall sample.  
18 For reasons of comparability, we also perform both OLS and Tobit estimations when the share of administrative costs 
is the dependent variable. However, just 1.6 percent of all NGOs in the sample do not report any costs of administration 
and management. See also the summary statistics in Appendix B.   10 
supposed to reflect the importance of a particular NGO’s sector  portfolio in international 
development cooperation – is not associated in a statistically significant way with the two shares of 
non-charitable expenditures.
19
Some of the  variables supposed to capture the heterogeneity of NGOs included in the 
sample also appear to be irrelevant for both dependent variables. Somewhat surprisingly perhaps, 
NGOs with more experience in international development cooperation are no more efficient than 
less experienced NGOs. It cannot be ruled out that this finding is because the date of registration 
with USAID does not adequately reflect the NGO’s experience. It is also possible, however, that 
experience has been used to divert funds for private use as much as it has been used to improve the 
efficiency of charitable operations. Countervailing effects may also be at work with regard to 
fundraising. Experienced NGOs might in principle be able to collect a certain amount of donations 
with less effort. However, it may become increasingly difficult over time for NGOs with clear 
visibility to free-ride on the fundraising efforts of their peers. 
 Note that the results for the sector dummies are suppressed in all 
tables for the sake for brevity. 
It does not make a difference in any of the estimations reported in Table 1 whether overseas 
programs figure more prominently in the NGO’s portfolio. Apparently the costs for administration 
and fundraising are incurred mainly within the United States even if program-related operations are 
largely abroad. The degree to which overseas activities are diversified has the expected ambiguous 
effects on non-charitable expenditure shares. The number of countries as well as the number of 
sectors in which an NGO is active typically has no significant impact on either administrative costs 
or fundraising expenses. There are a few exceptions, in column (6) of Table 1 and in subsequent 
tables, where both diversification measures enter significant with opposite signs. This has to be 
attributed to the high correlation of 0.82 between the two measures (see also Appendix C). If one 
measure of diversification is dropped, the other measure always turns insignificant in these cases 
(not shown).
20
Among the variables controlling for NGO heterogeneity it is mainly the size of NGOs, 
indicated by (logged) overall revenues, that proves to be strongly significant throughout all 
estimations reported in Table 1 (at the one percent level, except for column 5). Size works in 
opposite directions: it is associated with lower cost shares for administration and management but 
higher cost shares for fundraising. The former result points to economies of scale improving 
administrative efficiency. The latter result reveals that larger NGOs engage in relatively more 
fundraising. However, the quantitative impact is rather small in both regards: an increase by one 
 
                                                 
19 The OLS estimate without sector dummies and with the share of fundraising costs as the dependent variable is the 
only (minor) exception (column 5 of Table 1). 
20 Dropping one of the two variables in the estimations where both are insignificant does not alter the results; the 
variable still included remains insignificant.   11 
standard deviation  in overall revenues implies a decrease in the share of administrative and 
management costs by 0.021 percentage points (column 4) and an increase in the share of expenses 
for fundraising by 0.011 percentage points (column 8).
21
As for the characteristics of recipient countries, Table 1 provides only weak indications that 
the share of administrative costs increases when NGOs are engaged more strongly in relatively 
advanced countries. The average income in recipient countries enters significantly positive at the 
ten percent level when the estimations are run without sector dummies, while the average income 
proves insignificant once sector dummies are included. This suggests that any cost savings that 
NGOs may realize by working in easier environments are offset by additional costs incurred 
through higher local wages and rents in economically more advanced recipient countries. Better 
control of corruption in the recipient countries goes along with relatively more fundraising effort. 
While the effect is significant at the ten percent level only, the quantitative impact is considerable; 
an increase of control of corruption by one standard deviation would raise the share of expenses for 
fundraising by 0.57 percentage points (column 8). As argued in section 3, this could be because 
NGOs anticipate fundraising efforts to be more rewarding when private donors must be less 
concerned that their giving might support corrupt regimes.  
 Accordingly half of the positive effect on 
administrative efficiency would be compensated by the negative effect on fundraising costs. Apart 
from the size of NGOs, administrative costs seem to depend on where the headquarters of the 
NGOs are located. However, the positive effect of higher average per-capita income at HQ 
locations on administrative costs is no longer significant at conventional levels once sector 
dummies are included in OLS or Tobit estimations. 
Turning to our variables of principal interest, we find that NGOs being subject to fiercer 
competition have lower shares of administrative costs whereas the share of expenses for fundraising 
is unaffected. Taken together, competition appears to be associated with more efficient aid delivery 
through NGOs. The relation between our overlap indicator reflecting the degree of competition and 
relative fundraising efforts is not significant at conventional levels irrespective of whether OLS or 
Tobit estimations are performed, or whether sector dummies are included or not (columns 5 – 8 in 
Table 1). This contradicts earlier theoretical models according to which NGOs under fierce 
competitive pressure tend to engage in “excessive” fundraising (Rose-Ackerman 1982). Our finding 
is more in line with the theoretical ambiguity of the recent model by Aldashev and Verdier (2010). 
The insignificant coefficients of the overlap indicator could be the result of two countervailing 
effects: On the one hand, fiercer competition encourages more fundraising effort in order not to lose 
previous donors to other NGOs entering the “market.” On the other hand, fiercer competition 
                                                 
21 For the Tobit estimations, we calculated the marginal effects on E(y|x) at the mean of the explanatory variables in 
order to interpret the effects quantitatively. Complete results are available on request.   12 
discourages fundraising when NGOs expect to benefit from the efforts of competing peers and, 
conversely, the effects of their own efforts to be shared by free-riders. 
The  relation between competition and the share of administrative costs is significantly 
negative at the five percent level, irrespective of the estimation method and the treatment of sector 
dummies (columns 1 – 4). Quantitatively, an increase in the overlap indicator by one standard 
deviation implies a decrease in the share of administrative and management costs by 0.78 
percentage points (column 4). The case of US-based NGOs engaged in international development 
cooperation does not lend support to the skeptical view of Aldashev and Verdier (2010). According 
to their theoretical model, fiercer competition may even result in higher administrative costs 
because of the incentives of NGO managers to divert more resources away for personal use (see 
section 3). Rather, we corroborate the previous empirical finding of Castaneda et al. (2008) for 
NGOs with local charitable activity within the United States. 
In contrast to competition among peers, official refinancing of NGOs is associated with a 
higher share of administrative costs. The inclusion of sector dummies slightly weakens the level of 
significance to the five percent level, and reduces the size of the coefficients. However, the 
quantitative impact is still considerable: an increase in the share of official funds by one standard 
deviation leads to an increase in the share of administrative and management costs by 0.82 
percentage points (column 4). It should be noted that this finding is consistent with two arguments 
raised in section 3. First, official refinancing may involve cost-increasing bureaucracy and absorb 
management time. Second, the access to official funds may soften the non-distribution constraint of 
NGOs and allow for more perquisite consumption. The data situation does not allow us to 
discriminate between these two factors and decide on their relative importance. However, official 
funding of NGOs clearly threatens to impair the efficiency of NGO aid by going along with higher 
administrative costs. 
Nevertheless it would be premature to conclude that more official funding is necessarily 
related with less efficient NGO aid. It has to be taken into account that the share of expenses for 
fundraising is lower for NGOs with higher official funding. The coefficient of the share of official 
funds turns out to be significantly negative at the one percent level in all four estimations with 
fundraising as the dependent variable. In quantitative terms, an increase of the share of official 
funds by one standard deviation implies a decline of the share of expenses for fundraising by 1.58 
percentage points. Accordingly,  the efficiency loss in terms  of higher administrative and 
management costs is more than compensated by lower expenses for fundraising. In other words, 
officially funded NGOs spend relatively more on charitable activities even if more official funding 
increases bureaucratic waste and softens the non-distribution constraint; the reason is that officially   13 
funded NGOs appear to be less concerned with collecting private donations through fundraising 
efforts. 
Finally Table 1 reveals some interesting, though slightly ambiguous, findings for the share 
of private revenue in overall revenues of NGOs. According to the Tobit estimation reported in 
column (8), higher private revenues are correlated negatively with expenses for fundraising, at the 
five percent level of significance. This plausibly suggests that NGOs see less need to raise 
donations through fundraising if income from commercial activities figures more prominently as an 
alternative source of (private) financing.
22
Table 2 reports the results for an extended specification as well as those for a reduced NGO 
sample. The extension relates to the estimations with administrative costs as the dependent variable 
where we add the share of expenses for fundraising to the list of explanatory variables. As already 
mentioned in section 3 we remain cautious in drawing strong causal inferences. Yet the correlation 
between the two non-charitable NGO expenditure items may offer at least tentative insights on the 
argument of Aldashev and Verdier (2010) that fundraising and perquisite consumption tend to be 
complements. However, the correlation turns out to be insignificant when the full NGO sample is 
employed in OLS and Tobit estimations (columns 1 and 3). Note also that the extension by the 
share of expenses for fundraising hardly affects the corresponding baseline results in columns (2) 
and (4) of Table 1. 
  In the estimations with administrative costs as the 
dependent variable,  the hypothesis of “mental accounting” and using private revenue for non-
charitable expenses, including perquisite consumption, is no longer supported when sector dummies 
are included. 
 By contrast, reducing the NGO sample has some noticeable effects. We exclude those 
NGOs with extraordinarily high shares of either administrative costs or expenses for fundraising. 
More precisely, NGOs with cost shares exceeding the sample means by at least two standard 
deviations are excluded. As for administrative costs the most relevant change is that the overlap 
indicator  turns insignificant in columns (2) and (4). This qualifies the above reasoning that 
competition among NGOs may help contain administrative costs. As it seems, this effect is 
restricted to outliers with particularly high administrative costs.  
The previous finding that administrative costs increase with a higher share of official funds 
holds when reducing the sample. At the same time, columns (2) and (4) provide evidence for 
“mental accounting.” As can be seen, the positive link between the share of private revenue and 
administrative costs is as strong as the link between the share official funds and administrative 
costs. For the reduced sample, the correlation between the two non-charitable expenditure items 
                                                 
22 This effect turns insignificant when the sector dummies are dropped. However, the estimations with sector dummies 
are preferred; otherwise the share of private revenues may capture sector-specific effects.   14 
proves to be significant, though only at the ten percent level, offering weak support for the 
complementarity suggested by Aldashev and Verdier (2010). 
The previous findings for our variables of principal interest are hardly affected when 
considering the expenses for fundraising as the dependent variable in columns (5) and (6) of Table 
2. The results for the controlling variables weaken somewhat in two respects.
23
In Table 3 we present OLS estimations for the full sample of NGOs as in Table 1. In 
contrast to the baseline estimations, however, we distinguish between specific types and sources of 
official funding. In particular, we assess whether the effects of official funding on the two non-
charitable expenditure items differ between contract-related and other types of support. 
Alternatively, we differentiate between support from USAID, other US government agencies, and 
non-US governments and international organizations (IO). It should be noted that the differentiation 
of official funding hardly affects the baseline results for all other variables.
 The coefficients of 
the share of private revenue are no longer significant at conventional levels. Apparently it is mainly 
NGOs with extraordinarily high expenses for fundraising which reduce fundraising efforts when 
income from commercial activities figures more prominently as an alternative source of (private) 
financing. Likewise, expenses for fundraising are no longer correlated significantly with control of 
corruption. 
24
As mentioned in section 2, skeptics of the “marketization” of official NGO financing fear 
that contract-related support involves considerable administrative costs, whereas its proponents 
hope to enhance NGO efficiency in this way. In columns (1) and (2) of Table 3, both types of 
official funds are associated with higher administrative costs. While the size of the coefficients is 
larger for contract-related support, we find only weak evidence supporting  the skeptics of 
marketization. The quantitative impact of a one percent increase in both types of official funds is 
significantly larger (at the ten percent level) for contract-related support in column (1), but this 
difference is no longer significant once sector dummies are included in column (2). Furthermore, 
the correlation with the expenses for fundraising is similar for both types of official funds. The 
reduction of expenses for fundraising does not differ significantly at conventional levels when 
  
                                                 
23 Recall that it does not offer meaningful insights that the two diversification variables (number of countries and 
sectors in which the NGO is active) enter significant with opposite signs. The coefficients are no longer significant at 
conventional levels if one of the two (highly correlated) variables is dropped. 
24 Note also that all OLS estimations reported in Table 3 are replicated as Tobit estimations in Appendix D. In the light 
of the relatively few zero observations for administrative and management costs, it is hardly surprising that the 
estimation results are practically unaffected in columns (1) – (4) of Appendix D. As mentioned in section 3 there are 
considerably more zero observations when expenses for fundraising are the dependent variable. Nevertheless, the OLS 
results carry over to the Tobit estimations with just minor changes. As concerns our variables of major interest, the 
results are unaffected. An exception is the effect of the overlap indicator which turns out to be significant at the ten 
percent level in column (8). A few controlling variables lose their significance, but this change is rather marginal 
compared to Table 3.   15 
comparing a one percent increase in contract-related support and other types of official support in 
columns (5) and (6). 
Likewise, different sources of  official support have fairly similar effects on fundraising 
(columns 7 and 8). At the same time, support from USAID appears to be most likely to impair the 
efficiency of NGO aid by adding to the administrative costs of NGOs. The correlation of support 
from other US government sources and, respectively, non-US official sources with administrative 
costs is either relatively weak (column 3) or insignificant (column 4). In other words, our results are 
consistent with the view of Kerlin (2006) that USAID regulations and paperwork are particularly 
cumbersome. 
 
5.  Summary and conclusion 
NGOs are widely believed to be more efficient than official aid agencies in delivering foreign aid to 
the poor and needy in recipient countries. However, the relative importance of expenses not directly 
related with charitable activity differs strikingly within the sample of about 550 US-based NGOs 
engaged in international development cooperation. We focus on explaining the variation in the costs 
for administration and management as well as the expenses for fundraising. In particular, we assess 
how the structure of financing and the degree of competition among NGOs affect non-charitable 
expenses and the efficiency of NGO aid. We control for various aspects of NGO heterogeneity, and 
we also account for major characteristics of the recipient countries of US NGO aid. 
We find that the costs of administration and management tend to be relatively low for NGOs 
being subject to fiercer competition. However, this effect appears to be restricted to NGOs with 
particularly high administrative costs. Fiercer competition does not affect the expenses for 
fundraising across our sample of US NGOs. This contradicts earlier theoretical models according to 
which NGOs under fierce competitive pressure tend to engage in “excessive” fundraising (Rose-
Ackerman 1982). Taken together, these empirical findings suggest that competition among peers 
may help improve the efficiency of NGO aid.  
It remains to be seen whether similar results would hold for NGOs based in other donor 
countries. Another open  question is whether efficiency enhancing effects are restricted to 
competition by peers from the same home country (here the United States), or whether the 
nationality of competing NGOs does not matter in this regard. In any case, the link between 
competition and NGO efficiency may have important implications for the ongoing debate on donor 
fragmentation and aid proliferation.  Proliferation and fragmentation are widely feared to impair the 
effectiveness of aid by imposing high transaction costs on the recipient countries (e.g., Acharya et 
al. 2006). However, more coordination and specialization of donors, including the NGOs, may 
come at the cost of competition and donor efficiency.   16 
Likewise, the finding that officially funded NGOs spend relatively more on charitable 
activities qualifies the conventional wisdom according to which the dependence of NGOs on 
official ‘backdonors’ is “too close for comfort” (Edwards and Hulme 1996). This is even though 
official refinancing of US NGOs is associated with higher costs of administration and management. 
This efficiency loss is more than compensated by lower expenses for fundraising as officially 
funded NGOs appear to be less concerned with collecting private donations through fundraising 
efforts.  
It would clearly be desirable to gain deeper insights into the efficiency loss resulting from 
higher costs of administration and management. Most importantly, the available cost data do not 
allow us to differentiate between two possible explanations: bureaucratic regulations and paperwork 
imposed by the ‘backdonor’ on NGOs applying for official funds, or perquisite consumption 
resulting from softer non-distribution constraints. While the former factor would be relatively easy 
to remedy by simplifying application procedures, the latter factor would point to inherent trade-offs 
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Table 1 - Baseline results: OLS and Tobit 
  Share of administrative and management costs  Share of expenses for fundraising 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  OLS  OLS  Tobit  Tobit  OLS  OLS  Tobit  Tobit 
Registration date  -0.002  -0.007  -0.000  -0.005  0.011  0.016  0.031  0.033 
  (0.041)  (0.045)  (0.042)  (0.044)  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.036)  (0.035) 
Revenue (logged)  -1.235***  -1.045***  -1.217***  -1.025***  0.294**  0.380***  0.551***  0.644*** 
  (0.192)  (0.218)  (0.195)  (0.211)  (0.123)  (0.132)  (0.152)  (0.157) 
Share of official funds  0.051***  0.032**  0.051***  0.032**  -0.052***  -0.059***  -0.070***  -0.077*** 
  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Share of private revenue  0.049**  0.032  0.047**  0.030  -0.016  -0.023*  -0.024  -0.034** 
  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.016)  (0.015) 
Share of overseas programs  -0.007  -0.014  -0.008  -0.014  -0.012  -0.008  -0.013  -0.006 
  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Countries active (weighted by revenue)  -10.589  -11.177  -10.235  -10.807  -10.307  -14.546*  -18.146  -23.627 
  (6.765)  (7.098)  (7.059)  (7.145)  (8.333)  (8.538)  (17.063)  (18.315) 
Sectors active (weighted by revenue)  0.344  1.232  0.140  1.086  4.418  5.814*  6.406  8.329 
  (1.890)  (1.999)  (2.085)  (2.091)  (3.160)  (3.290)  (4.810)  (5.118) 
Overlap with overseas programs of other NGOs (weighted by  -0.076**  -0.079**  -0.078**  -0.081**  0.047  0.053  0.055  0.062 
population)  (0.031)  (0.035)  (0.031)  (0.033)  (0.042)  (0.038)  (0.045)  (0.039) 
Number of NGOs active in sectors  0.000  -0.001  0.000  -0.001  -0.001*  0.001  -0.001  0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
GDP per capita (average; logged)  1.101*  0.775  1.100*  0.789  -0.729  -0.768  -0.720  -0.711 
  (0.633)  (0.681)  (0.641)  (0.658)  (0.547)  (0.558)  (0.609)  (0.598) 
Control of corruption (average)  -1.134  -1.247  -1.221  -1.336  2.414*  2.289*  2.567*  2.373* 
  (1.336)  (1.410)  (1.353)  (1.365)  (1.243)  (1.169)  (1.389)  (1.257) 
Distance to capital (average; logged)  0.853  0.536  0.872  0.557  0.925  0.577  1.105  0.705 
  (0.991)  (1.086)  (1.006)  (1.052)  (1.017)  (0.942)  (1.136)  (1.005) 
Income per capita – HQ (logged)  3.627**  2.503  3.669**  2.525  0.345  0.185  0.282  0.073 
  (1.631)  (1.749)  (1.648)  (1.702)  (1.128)  (1.139)  (1.271)  (1.231) 
Constant  -24.919  0.924  -28.572  -2.582  -24.012  -29.728  -67.962  -68.249 
  (89.341)  (95.105)  (90.090)  (92.072)  (65.197)  (69.041)  (75.524)  (76.041) 
                 
Sector dummies  no  yes  no  yes  no  yes  no  yes 
Observations  518  518  518  518  518  518  518  518 
R-squared  0.144  0.234      0.101  0.212     
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   20 
Table 2 - Extended specification and outliers excluded: OLS and Tobit 
  Share of administrative and management costs  Share of expenses for fundraising 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  OLS  OLS  Tobit  Tobit  OLS  Tobit 
Registration date  -0.007  -0.008  -0.006  -0.007  -0.017  -0.007 
  (0.045)  (0.032)  (0.043)  (0.031)  (0.022)  (0.025) 
Revenue (logged)  -1.067***  -0.672***  -1.046***  -0.657***  0.286***  0.469*** 
  (0.217)  (0.164)  (0.210)  (0.159)  (0.104)  (0.121) 
Share of official funds  0.036***  0.039***  0.035***  0.039***  -0.046***  -0.059*** 
  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.006)  (0.008) 
Share of private revenue  0.033  0.039**  0.031  0.038**  -0.013  -0.020 
  (0.021)  (0.017)  (0.020)  (0.017)  (0.011)  (0.013) 
Share of overseas programs  -0.014  -0.018**  -0.014  -0.018**  -0.005  -0.004 
  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
Countries active (weighted by revenue)  -10.357  -7.105  -10.038  -6.876  -8.206**  -19.062** 
  (7.071)  (6.011)  (7.064)  (5.967)  (3.636)  (9.070) 
Sectors active (weighted by revenue)  0.904  1.153  0.786  1.078  2.831**  5.514** 
  (2.013)  (1.757)  (2.067)  (1.776)  (1.323)  (2.339) 
Overlap with overseas programs of other NGOs (weighted by population)  -0.082**  -0.045  -0.084**  -0.046  0.016  0.023 
  (0.035)  (0.031)  (0.033)  (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.031) 
Number of NGOs active in sectors  -0.002  -0.001  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  -0.000 
  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
GDP per capita (average; logged)  0.818  0.815  0.828  0.822  -0.511  -0.471 
  (0.678)  (0.540)  (0.652)  (0.518)  (0.357)  (0.402) 
Control of corruption (average)  -1.376  -1.056  -1.459  -1.116  0.830  0.820 
  (1.405)  (1.145)  (1.355)  (1.102)  (0.810)  (0.901) 
Distance to capital (average; logged)  0.504  0.611  0.526  0.628  0.381  0.494 
  (1.085)  (0.865)  (1.050)  (0.834)  (0.626)  (0.705) 
Income per capita - HQ (logged)  2.492  0.979  2.515  0.983  -0.509  -0.658 
  (1.750)  (1.286)  (1.700)  (1.250)  (0.823)  (0.897) 
Share of expenses for fundraising  0.056  0.095*  0.055  0.094*     
  (0.059)  (0.053)  (0.060)  (0.054)     
Constant  2.600  11.499  -0.972  9.388  41.066  19.053 
  (95.000)  (67.436)  (91.864)  (65.296)  (47.743)  (53.075) 
             
Sector dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Outliers excluded  no  yes  no  yes  yes  yes 
Observations  518  492  518  492  495  495 
R-squared  0.235  0.268      0.226   
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   21 
Table 3 - Differentiation of official funds: OLS 
  Share of administrative and management costs  Share of expenses for fundraising 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Registration date  -0.003  -0.007  -0.001  -0.004  0.011  0.016  0.012  0.019 
  (0.041)  (0.045)  (0.042)  (0.045)  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.032) 
Revenue (logged)  -1.232***  -1.042***  -1.237***  -1.045***  0.294**  0.380***  0.294**  0.385*** 
  (0.192)  (0.218)  (0.193)  (0.218)  (0.123)  (0.132)  (0.124)  (0.133) 
Share of official funds - contracts  0.118***  0.080*      -0.045**  -0.055**     
  (0.039)  (0.046)      (0.019)  (0.022)     
Share of official funds - others  0.044***  0.027**      -0.053***  -0.059***     
  (0.012)  (0.013)      (0.008)  (0.008)     
Share of USAID funds      0.063***  0.044**      -0.059***  -0.060*** 
      (0.020)  (0.021)      (0.009)  (0.010) 
Share of other US government support      0.044**  0.017      -0.053***  -0.062*** 
      (0.022)  (0.022)      (0.011)  (0.013) 
Share of other government or IO support      0.047**  0.034      -0.041***  -0.055*** 
      (0.019)  (0.020)      (0.012)  (0.013) 
Share of private revenue  0.050**  0.033  0.049**  0.031  -0.016  -0.023*  -0.015  -0.024* 
  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Share of overseas programs  -0.005  -0.013  -0.009  -0.016  -0.012  -0.008  -0.011  -0.008 
  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Countries active (weighted by revenue)  -10.814  -11.411  -10.791  -11.395  -10.330  -14.563*  -10.187  -14.596* 
  (6.826)  (7.109)  (6.759)  (7.044)  (8.350)  (8.554)  (8.333)  (8.557) 
Sectors active (weighted by revenue)  0.365  1.278  0.374  1.299  4.420  5.818*  4.414  5.858* 
  (1.912)  (2.009)  (1.896)  (1.984)  (3.163)  (3.295)  (3.174)  (3.297) 
Overlap with overseas programs of other NGOs (weighted by population)  -0.079***  -0.081**  -0.079**  -0.081**  0.047  0.053  0.049  0.054 
  (0.030)  (0.034)  (0.031)  (0.034)  (0.042)  (0.038)  (0.042)  (0.038) 
Number of NGOs active in sectors  0.000  -0.001  0.000  -0.002  -0.001*  0.001  -0.001*  0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
GDP per capita (average; logged)  0.977  0.712  1.048*  0.766  -0.742  -0.772  -0.659  -0.726 
  (0.640)  (0.682)  (0.636)  (0.678)  (0.554)  (0.560)  (0.556)  (0.563) 
Control of corruption (average)  -0.885  -1.070  -1.030  -1.160  2.439*  2.302*  2.348*  2.254* 
  (1.349)  (1.418)  (1.346)  (1.414)  (1.254)  (1.179)  (1.255)  (1.180) 
Distance to capital (average; logged)  0.785  0.504  0.765  0.489  0.918  0.575  1.010  0.636 
  (0.975)  (1.073)  (0.995)  (1.086)  (1.020)  (0.943)  (1.023)  (0.946) 
Income per capita - HQ (logged)  3.646**  2.559  3.589**  2.514  0.347  0.189  0.332  0.147 
  (1.634)  (1.743)  (1.636)  (1.752)  (1.129)  (1.141)  (1.133)  (1.140) 
Constant  -21.584  2.669  -25.211  -2.568  -23.669  -29.602  -27.411  -35.794 
  (88.751)  (94.722)  (90.110)  (96.038)  (65.358)  (69.175)  (65.687)  (69.360) 
                 
Sector dummies  no  yes  no  yes  no  yes  no  yes 
Observations  518  518  518  518  518  518  518  518 
R-squared  0.149  0.236  0.146  0.235  0.101  0.212  0.101  0.212 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   22 
Appendix A - Description of variables and sources 
Variable  Definition  Source 
Share of administrative and management 
costs 
Administrative and management costs as a share of total expenses; in percent; 
2007 
USAID 2009 VolAg Report, http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-
cutting_programs/private_voluntary_cooperation/volag2009.pdf 
Share of expenses for fundraising  Fundraising costs as a share of total expenses; in percent; 2007  USAID 2009 VolAg Report 




Revenue (logged)  Total support and revenue of NGOs; US$; logged; 2007  USAID 2009 VolAg Report 
Share of official funds  Official funding of NGOs as a share of total revenue; in percent; 2007  USAID 2009 VolAg Report 
Share of official funds - contracts  Official funding of NGOs  as a share of total revenue - only contract-related 
support; in percent; 2007 
USAID 2009 VolAg Report 
Share of official funds - others  Official funding of NGOs as a share of total revenue – other than contract-related 
support; in percent; 2007 
USAID 2009 VolAg Report 
Share of USAID funds  USAID funding of NGOs  as a share of total revenue; in percent; 2007  USAID 2009 VolAg Report 
Share of other US government support  Other US government support (excl. USAID) as a share of total revenue; in 
percent; 2007 
USAID 2009 VolAg Report 
Share of other government or IO support  Support by non-US governments or international organizations as a share of total  
revenue; in percent; 2007 
USAID 2009 VolAg Report 
Share of private revenue  Private revenue of NGOs as a share of total revenue; in percent; 2007  USAID 2009 VolAg Report 
Share of overseas programs  Expenses of NGOs for foreign programs as a share of total expenses; in percent; 
2007 
USAID 2009 VolAg Report 
Countries active (weighted by revenue)  Number of countries in which the NGO is active; divided by total revenue; 2007  USAID 2009 VolAg Report 
Sectors active (weighted by revenue)  Number of  sectors in which the NGO is active; divided by total revenue; 2007  USAID 2009 VolAg Report 
Overlap with overseas programs of other 
NGOs (weighted by population) 
Approximation of the expenses of other US NGOs in the recipient countries in 
which the NGO is active; divided by the total population of these countries; 2007 
USAID 2009 VolAg Report; World Bank 2010, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do (accessed: June 2010) 
Number of NGOs active in sectors  Number of US NGOs in the sectors in which the NGO is active; 2007  USAID 2009 VolAg Report 
GDP per capita (average; logged)  GDP per capita of the recipient country; averaged over the countries in which the 
NGO is active; PPP; logged; 2006 
World Bank 2010, http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do 
(accessed: June 2010) 
Control of corruption (average)  Control of corruption of the recipient country; averaged over the countries in 
which the NGO is active; 2006 
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp 
Distance to capital (average; logged)  Distance to the capital of the recipient country; averaged over the countries in 
which the NGO is active; km; logged 
CEPII, http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm 
Income per capita - HQ (logged)  Average per capita income in the metropolitan area in which the headquarter of 
the NGO is located; US$; logged; 2006 
US Census Bureau, State and Metropolitan Area Data Book 
Basic education, basic health etc.  Dummy variables for the sectors; equal to "one" if the NGO is active in the 
respective sector 
USAID 2009 VolAg Report   23 
Appendix B - Summary statistics 
   Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Share of administrative and management costs  559  10.13  7.98  0  50.61 
Share of expenses for fundraising  559  4.37  5.50  0  40.11 
Registration date  543  1997  10  1977  2009 
Revenue (logged)  559  15.40  2.33  7.67  21.63 
Share of official funds  559  21.06  28.71  0  99.59 
Share of official funds - contracts  559  1.93  8.79  0  82.27 
Share of official funds - others  559  19.13  27.02  0  99.59 
Share of USAID funds  559  8.06  17.81  0  99.31 
Share of other US government support  559  6.14  15.65  0.00  86.08 
Share of other government or IO support  559  6.31  15.01  0  97.19 
Share of private revenue  559  10.97  19.53  -0.69  95.60 
Share of overseas programs  559  77.61  33.60  0  100.00 
Countries active (weighted by revenue)  559  0.01  0.06  0  0.94 
Sectors active (weighted by revenue)  559  0.03  0.21  0  4.22 
Overlap with overseas programs of other NGOs (weighted by population)  524  6.94  10.69  0.13  65.24 
Number of NGOs active in sectors  524  1146  416  1  1984 
GDP per capita (average; logged)  522  8.21  0.77  5.63  10.13 
Control of corruption (average)  524  -0.59  0.34  -1.59  0.97 
Distance to capital (average; logged)  524  9.05  0.39  7.51  9.70 
Income per capita - HQ (logged)  539  10.71  0.22  10.04  11.36 
Basic education  559  0.29  0.45  0  1 
Basic health  559  0.47  0.50  0  1 
Child survival  559  0.32  0.47  0  1 
Clearinghouse  559  0.01  0.08  0  1 
Commodity and freight  559  0.11  0.32  0  1 
Community development  559  0.37  0.48  0  1 
Conflict management  559  0.08  0.28  0  1 
Conservation  559  0.10  0.30  0  1 
Cooperatives  559  0.05  0.21  0  1 
Credit support  559  0.04  0.19  0  1 
Crop and livestock development  559  0.15  0.36  0  1 
Democratic initiatives  559  0.10  0.30  0  1 
Disaster relief and assistance  559  0.27  0.44  0  1 
Ecology  559  0.04  0.20  0  1 
Education and communication  559  0.16  0.37  0  1 
Family planning  559  0.12  0.32  0  1 
Financial markets  559  0.04  0.19  0  1 
Food security and food aid  559  0.18  0.38  0  1 
Girls' education  559  0.12  0.33  0  1 
HIV/AIDS and infectious diseases  559  0.37  0.48  0  1 
Housing  559  0.09  0.29  0  1 
Information  559  0.16  0.37  0  1 
Institution strengthening and development  559  0.38  0.49  0  1 
Literacy  559  0.11  0.31  0  1 
Microenterprise  559  0.19  0.39  0  1 
Natural resources  559  0.09  0.28  0  1 
Neonatal care  559  0.12  0.33  0  1 
Network and alliance building  559  0.27  0.44  0  1 
NGO strengthening  559  0.33  0.47  0  1 
Nonformal education  559  0.10  0.30  0  1 
Nutrition  559  0.25  0.43  0  1 
Partnership development  559  0.35  0.48  0  1 
Policy advocacy  559  0.12  0.33  0  1 
Refugee assistance  559  0.13  0.33  0  1 
Rehabilitation  559  0.11  0.32  0  1 
Resettlement  559  0.04  0.19  0  1 
Rural development  559  0.17  0.38  0  1 
Small enterprise development  559  0.15  0.36  0  1 
Training  559  0.39  0.49  0  1 
Transportation  559  0.03  0.18  0  1 
Urban development  559  0.03  0.17  0  1 
Vocational education  559  0.19  0.39  0  1 
Water and sanitation  559  0.25  0.43  0  1 
Women in development  559  0.18  0.39  0  1 
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Appendix C - Correlation matrix 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19)  (20) 
(1) Share of administrative and management 
costs  1.00                                       
(2) Share of expenses for fundraising  -0.01  1.00                                     
(3) Registration date  0.10  0.04  1.00                                   
(4) Revenue (logged)  -0.23  0.00  -0.52  1.00                                 
(5) Share of official funds  0.13  -0.24  -0.19  0.24  1.00                               
(6) Share of official funds - contracts  0.12  -0.08  -0.03  0.07  0.34  1.00                             
(7) Share of official funds - others  0.10  -0.23  -0.20  0.23  0.96  0.05  1.00                           
(8) Share of USAID funds  0.09  -0.19  -0.23  0.19  0.65  0.24  0.62  1.00                         
(9) Share of other US government support  0.07  -0.12  -0.03  0.13  0.56  0.36  0.49  0.02  1.00                       
(10) Share of other government or IO 
support  0.08  -0.09  -0.03  0.08  0.52  -0.02  0.55  0.02  -0.01  1.00                     
(11) Share of private revenue  0.09  0.02  -0.10  0.08  -0.14  -0.06  -0.13  -0.13  -0.06  -0.04  1.00                   
(12) Share of overseas programs  -0.06  -0.04  -0.08  -0.04  -0.05  -0.09  -0.02  0.18  -0.20  -0.12  -0.35  1.00                 
(13) Countries active (weighted by revenue)  0.03  0.03  0.13  -0.41  -0.11  -0.03  -0.11  -0.07  -0.06  -0.06  -0.05  -0.01  1.00               
(14) Sectors active (weighted by revenue)  0.03  0.08  0.13  -0.36  -0.09  -0.02  -0.09  -0.06  -0.05  -0.04  -0.05  0.02  0.82  1.00             
(15) Overlap with overseas programs of 
other NGOs (weighted by population)  -0.10  0.05  0.13  -0.20  -0.10  -0.01  -0.11  -0.04  -0.08  -0.07  -0.07  0.03  0.02  0.06  1.00           
(16) Number of NGOs active in sectors  -0.02  -0.08  -0.08  0.10  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.08  -0.04  -0.02  -0.12  0.13  -0.05  0.02  -0.01  1.00         
(17) GDP per capita (average; logged)  0.03  0.00  -0.13  0.22  -0.04  0.03  -0.05  -0.03  0.05  -0.08  0.13  -0.08  -0.03  -0.08  -0.15  -0.03  1.00       
(18) Control of corruption (average)  0.02  0.09  -0.13  0.11  -0.08  -0.06  -0.06  -0.08  0.03  -0.06  0.10  -0.06  0.08  0.02  -0.21  -0.05  0.68  1.00     
(19) Distance to capital (average; logged)  0.09  0.00  -0.05  0.08  0.15  0.03  0.15  0.12  0.09  0.06  -0.04  0.06  -0.02  0.01  -0.61  0.01  -0.13  0.07  1.00   
(20) Income per capita - HQ (logged)  0.12  -0.03  -0.09  0.07  0.19  0.05  0.19  0.14  0.10  0.10  0.01  0.07  -0.04  -0.03  -0.02  -0.04  0.12  0.13  0.04  1.00 
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Appendix D - Differentiation of official funds: Tobit 
   Share of administrative and management costs  Share of expenses for fundraising 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Registration date  -0.001  -0.006  0.001  -0.003  0.031  0.033  0.029  0.034 
  (0.041)  (0.043)  (0.042)  (0.044)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.036)  (0.035) 
Revenue (logged)  -1.214***  -1.022***  -1.218***  -1.025***  0.551***  0.644***  0.551***  0.652*** 
  (0.195)  (0.212)  (0.195)  (0.211)  (0.152)  (0.157)  (0.152)  (0.157) 
Share of official funds – contracts  0.115***  0.079*      -0.066**  -0.082***     
  (0.040)  (0.044)      (0.029)  (0.030)     
Share of official funds – others  0.044***  0.027**      -0.070***  -0.077***     
  (0.012)  (0.012)      (0.010)  (0.010)     
Share of USAID funds      0.062***  0.043**      -0.088***  -0.089*** 
      (0.021)  (0.021)      (0.015)  (0.015) 
Share of other US government support      0.044**  0.017      -0.066***  -0.077*** 
      (0.021)  (0.021)      (0.015)  (0.016) 
Share of other government or IO support      0.047**  0.033*      -0.048***  -0.066*** 
      (0.019)  (0.020)      (0.017)  (0.017) 
Share of private revenues  0.048**  0.031  0.047**  0.030  -0.024  -0.034**  -0.023  -0.034** 
  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.015) 
Share of overseas programs  -0.006  -0.013  -0.009  -0.016  -0.012  -0.006  -0.010  -0.005 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010) 
Countries active (weighted by revenues)  -10.454  -11.034  -10.422  -11.012  -18.153  -23.616  -17.697  -23.507 
  (7.105)  (7.146)  (7.040)  (7.082)  (17.065)  (18.324)  (16.832)  (18.248) 
Sectors active (weighted by revenues)  0.164  1.131  0.168  1.149  6.406  8.326  6.339  8.347 
  (2.102)  (2.099)  (2.088)  (2.075)  (4.809)  (5.120)  (4.778)  (5.107) 
Overlap with overseas programs of other NGOs (weighted by population)  -0.080***  -0.083**  -0.080**  -0.082**  0.055  0.062  0.060  0.066* 
  (0.030)  (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.033)  (0.045)  (0.039)  (0.045)  (0.039) 
Number of NGOs active in sectors  0.000  -0.001  0.000  -0.002  -0.001  0.001  -0.001  0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
GDP per capita (average; logged)  0.980  0.727  1.047  0.780  -0.726  -0.706  -0.610  -0.643 
  (0.647)  (0.658)  (0.643)  (0.654)  (0.615)  (0.599)  (0.619)  (0.600) 
Control of corruption (average)  -0.979  -1.162  -1.121  -1.253  2.578*  2.356*  2.442*  2.282* 
  (1.365)  (1.371)  (1.360)  (1.365)  (1.397)  (1.266)  (1.399)  (1.264) 
Distance to capital (average; logged)  0.805  0.526  0.785  0.511  1.101  0.709  1.259  0.827 
  (0.990)  (1.039)  (1.008)  (1.050)  (1.138)  (1.003)  (1.143)  (1.008) 
Income per capita – HQ (logged)  3.688**  2.582  3.633**  2.537  0.282  0.069  0.283  0.028 
  (1.649)  (1.694)  (1.650)  (1.702)  (1.271)  (1.232)  (1.272)  (1.228) 
Constant  -25.510  -1.037  -28.592  -6.027  -67.783  -68.415  -68.200  -71.627 
  (89.411)  (91.605)  (90.811)  (92.938)  (75.692)  (76.099)  (75.700)  (76.016) 
                 
Sector dummies  no  yes  no  yes  no  yes  no  yes 
Observations  518  518  518  518  518  518  518  518 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 